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Review Essay

The Limits of Liberalism: Wrong to Others
Patrick Baude

JOEL

FEINBERG, The MoralLimits of the CriminalLaw, Volume 1: Harm to
Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. 269. $29.95.

In his preface to this first of a projected four volumes on the moral limits
of the criminal law, Joel Feinberg reports that his project began as one
philosophical chapter promised for a book about victimless crimes. We can
be grateful that his reflections on the impossibility of fulfilling that promise
led him to undertake these volumes rather than forget the whole thing. Even
so, the genesis of the work has influenced its shape: this is primarily a study
of whether criminal law should extend beyond its core of the "harm to
others" principle, not an exploration of how the criminal law should deal
with philosophical issues arising within that core. Feinberg's earlier Doing
and Deserving (1970) remains an important contribution to those questions-for example, see his chapter "On Being 'Morally Speaking a Murderer.'"
The object of his inquiry is the liberal position on the scope of the criminal
law, which was given its classic expression by John Stuart Mill: "the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."I Feinberg's purpose is to make that position as appealing as possible by discrediting the positions of legal paternalism (in vol. 3, Harm to Sel) and of legal
moralism (in vol. 4, Harmless Wrongdoing). One dilemma of that liberal
position has been the question of the state's power to protect individuals
from the "offense" involved in acts such as pornography or the display of
Nazi emblems. That controversy has volume 2 (Offense to Others)to itself.
The foundation of the liberal position as Feinberg defends it is "the view that
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1. J.S. Mill, On Liberty 10-11 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).
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the harm and offense principles, duly clarified and qualified, between them
exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal prohibitions" (vol.
1, at 14-15).
The defense of that position gives to this first volume its central mission of
strengthening the concept of harm to others. Those of us who would stand
with Mill if we can still have strong intuitions that certain not obviously
harmful-to-others conduct should be punished. Examples of these test cases
might include harming the dead, dueling between consenting adults, or the
mere failure to provide life-saving assistance in an emergency. The mission of
volume 1 is to convince us that these concepts can be found within the realm
of harm to others, hence that we need not choose between liberalism and our
humanitarian intuitions.
The author makes his method explicit. By clarifying fundamental concepts, working them through both clear cases and doubtful ones, modifying
principles as necessary, and taking positions on concrete cases where he
must, Feinberg aims to produce the most plausible case he can for the position that harms and some offenses to others are the only legitimate occasions
for the use of the criminal law. He hopes that we will then be persuaded by
this most plausible case, but whether we in fact are is our own business. His
subsequent volumes will inspire more predictable resistance: the "extreme"
liberal (Feinberg's label) will resist the idea that offensiveness is enough for a
crime, and the nonliberal will, because it is her or his chosen lot in life to do
so, rise to defend legal moralism. The conclusions of volume I itself are less
likely to stir political disagreement, since there is nearly total agreement that
preventing harm to others is at least one proper end of the criminal law.
In many ways, then, the freedom from political controversy over prevention of harm to others makes this point the best place to dispute the concepts
Feinberg means to clarify and refine. I remain unpersuaded for two reasons.
First, Feinberg does not adequately account for important differences between the criminal law and other forms of governmental coercion. Second,
his assumption that the concept of legitimacy is intuitively obvious obscures
much that needs to be clarified.
Before I turn to my disagreements I should sketch the powerful positive
accomplishments of the book. The structure of the four volumes provides a
coherent framework for discussing the moral boundaries of the criminal law.
The paternalist might challenge the division by arguing that harm to oneself
necessarily harms others indirectly, just as the moralist might argue that immoral acts often end up in real but hard-to-trace damage. Even so, Feinberg's structure makes it possible to discuss the subject intelligibly.
"Harm" is of course a common sense concept, but Feinberg poses a number of "puzzling cases." Typical of these is whether one can be "harmed"
after death. In Feinberg's analysis, harm is what happens contrary to our
"interests," not to our persons. In that light it seems natural to recognize
that the interests one had during one's lifetime can be set back by events that
come to be known after one's death. The interests of the unborn are more
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difficult. If an injury is done to an unborn child who survives to suffer from
it, it is not hard to say that the child's interests are set back by the injury.
There are two harder cases. First, suppose the child is not born at all. This
question, which encompasses abortion, is one Feinberg puts to the side of the
present work by saying that the unborn are harmed only after they stop being
mere "fetal prepersons," whenever that is. (Surely we must allow Feinberg
the right to set the abortion issue aside in this volume, especially since he has
discussed it elsewhere.) 2 Second, suppose the only harm to the child is that he
or she was born-for example, born with a severely disabling genetic disease
following a recklessly performed sterilization of the mother. In this situation,
according to the author, the child has a moral grievance (at 102) and even a
civil action, but there can be no crime against the child (as distinct from the
mother) because the child's interests have not been set back by being conceived.
This last illustration introduces another key step in the analysis of crimes.
People can be "wronged" by a violation of their "rights" even though they
have not been "harmed." One example, borrowed from Fried's Right and
Wrong, is the failure to perform a gratuitous promise. If there has been detrimental reliance, there might be harm. Even without that reliance, though,
there might be a "wrong" which the civil law could justly remedy (although
ours mostly doesn't). Feinberg has thus created an area of immoral conduct
which is the business of the state (wrongful conception, for instance) but only
through the civil process, not the criminal law.
About one-quarter of the book is devoted to a painstaking demonstration
that bad samaritans can be punished under the harm principle. The major
philosophical obstruction to this abstract proposal is the showing that omissions can be causes. The thoroughness of Feinberg's treatment on this point
is itself more than reason to welcome the whole book. One could profitably
spend a long time pondering the hypothetical case of a lounger by poolside
who finds himself equidistant from two drowing babies (only one of whom
can be saved in the time availabe) but merely continues to lounge, making no
effort toward either one (at 144). No doubt the best-known objection to
criminal liability for failure to aid is Macaulay's concern, expressed in the
drafting of the Indian Penal Code, with the practical difficulty of drawing a
line between the redistribution of income (which we now think of, for better
or worse, as the business of tax law rather than criminal law) and the more
pressing case of giving aid in special situations. Feinberg answers Macaulay's
concern with his belief that criminal statutes here can be written in relatively
vague terms and juries can be allowed the "discretion to apply standards of
reasonable danger, cost, and inconvenience. Juries in civil cases have long
been entrusted with such judgments" (at 157). Juries do many things in civil
cases that we have, at least traditionally, been reluctant to allow in criminal
2. See Joel Feinberg, Abortion, in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death 182 (New York: Random House, 1979).
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cases. Indeed, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which would be the principal
constitutional objection to Feinberg's resolution of Macaulay's doubts, applies only in criminal cases.
Feinberg defines his audience as morally concerned legislators. American
law being what it is, that is to say, legislative power being as diffused as it is
between bodies called "legislatures" and other bodies that act the same way
(especially constitutional courts, courts formulating common law doctrines,
and juries in cases of vaguely worded rules), it is in fact rather difficult to figure out exactly what use to make of the ideas in this book. The author seems
to recognize this point when he says that these "volumes might also be
thought of (presumptuous as it sounds) as addressed to ideal constitutionmakers in some hypothetical constitutional assembly" (at 5-6). American
law being what it really is, the officials most likely to use this book, licensed
or not, are constitutional courts. The United States Supreme Court has of
course found unconstitutional several criminal statutes dealing with harmless
wrongdoing. In some well-known cases the Court's decision has been explained by a right to engage in the conduct in question, cases such as the private possession of obscenity:3 in such cases, Feinberg's theory is unlikely to
explain much, since these are, in form at least, cases about the affirmative
right to do something, rather than mere statements about the limits of the
criminal law. In other cases, however, the Supreme Court seems to find some
distinctive limit on the criminal law's ability to reach harmless-to-others acts
-for instance, the status of drug addiction cannot be made a crime, although there is no right to take drugs," or the failure to satisfy an unknown
duty to register cannot be a crime,' even though there is no right to remain
unregistered. Even the present constitutional situation with respect to abortion invites an analysis as much in terms of the limits of the criminal law as in
terms of the official rationale of the "right" to privacy. The Supreme Court
has struck down criminal sanctions on abortion while upholding surprisingly
aggressive restrictions on the actual availability of abortions-"surprisingly," that is, if abortion is really a constitutional right rather than merely
something left outside the sweep of the criminal sanction. 6
It is unfortunately at this point-where philosophical illumination on current "legislative" issues in the limits of the criminal law is most needed-that
Feinberg fails to realize the promise implicit in the title for his overall work.
Much of his analysis is a plausible description of the moral limits of governmental action, but he does not give a coherent account of why the criminal
law should be more limited in these matters than civil or administrative control from the government. His principal discussion is in a three-page section
entitled "Alternatives to the Criminal Law," in which he makes the point
that "penal legislation, on the whole, is a more drastic and serious thing than
3.
4.
5.
6.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 255 (1957).
Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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its main alterantives, if only because criminal punishment (usually imprisonment) is a more frightening evil than lost inducements, increased taxes, and
various civil disabilities, and in a sense to be explained (ch. 23) more 'coercive"' (at 23). He then gives a specific justification of a tax on smoking (since
an actual criminal prohibition would be legal paternalism). He explains that
the tax is different for three reasons. First, there is "a difference in the mode
of coercion so significant that it amounts to a difference in kind as well as
degree." Second, the suppression of smoking by the tax may be just enough
to keep the activity below "the threshold of harm to the public." Third, the
tax can be explained on grounds of financing "social costs (lost productivity,
hospitalization, medical care, etc.)." I find this a convincing explanation of
taxation as a special case. But there are legal measures that are neither taxes
nor crimes.
There are, in other words, civil suits for damages. Indeed, at several key
points, Feinberg relies on the civil remedy to assure us that wrong will not be
left unrestrained. He argues that moral rights without harm may be the basis
of civil actions but not criminal punishments. In a significant passage involving liability for wrongful conception, he takes this position:
The harm principle does not permit criminal liability for "wrongful conception" since the act causing the conception does not cause harm in the special
narrow sense that requires both set-back interests and violated rights.
(Although there can be criminal liability for the sexual act insofar as it harms
and wrongs the sexual partner or third parties.) But since infant-rights are

violated in the case where inherited impairment is severe, there is no reason
why the wrongful progenitors (or other wrongful facilitators-doctors,
pharmaceutical companies, earlier partners transmitting venereal disease, etc.)
should not be held civilly liable to pay damages to the child. (At 102)

I am not intuitively drawn to Feinberg's idea that injuries that merely violate
rights, without doing harm, should be beyond the reach of criminal law. My
objection here, however, is on the institutional ground that the way civil
remedies work will leave many rights without real legal protection. Civil
remedies for damages are by their nature merely instrumental. They can be
insured against, passed on as a cost to others, avoided altogether by the insolvent, and bargained away in advance. In fact, the very logic of the basic civil
remedy, "damages," is a logic of harm. A tort suit where there is no harm
will either not be brought or else will result in something like a windfall
benefit for the plaintiff. Criminal convictions, on the other hand, can be
satisfied only by the "wrongdoer," as we usually say, or by the "harmdoer,"
as we might say with Feinberg. I can get other people to pay tort judgments
against me-my customers or my insurer, or, most likely, I can get my
customers to pay my insurer to pay my plaintiffs. Unless I command immense loyalty, I can't get anyone else to go to jail for me. Even if a criminal
conviction does not produce ajail sentence, it is still the defendant personally
who will be disabled from voting, from practicing accountancy, and so on.
The personal nature of criminal liability makes it different from civil liability
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because we make the criminal suffer. The key to that decision as a matter of
justice should be his immorality. He should suffer for his wrongs and pay for
his harms. Feinberg of course recognizes that crimes imply wrongdoing-the
definition he uses of "harm" for purposes of the criminal law is this: "when
we speak of 'harm' we shall refer to the effect on a person B when another
person, A, wrongfully harms B" (at 105). I still think this puts the situation7
backward. As Feinberg would have it, wrongs can be either torts or crimes:
those wrongs which are also harms are crimes. As I would have it, damaging
acts are either torts or crimes: those which are also wrong are crimes.
Obviously, my way of speaking would not suffice for a general theory of
criminal law unless it too had four volumes of definitions and qualifications,
and probably not even then. I think the central point remains, though, that
the distinctive institutional features of criminal law cannot be explained by
putting damage at the dividing line between civil and criminal. Let me put the
same point positively rather than negatively. I have reasons of substance
behind not wanting the state to interest itself in my books, my reproductive
practices, my fondness for cholesterol: these reasons of substance suggest a
vision of human freedom, autonomy, and dignity. I think that it is this vision
of the good life that gives the liberal theory of the state its appeal. Let the
state enter my library, my bedroom, or my kitchen, whether by civil or
criminal regulation, and the positive case for liberalism is gone.
An abstract way to make my point is by a bastardized application of the
Coase theorem' to Feinberg's previously quoted example of wrongful conception. Remember Feinberg's basic conclusion that a child who has been
wrongfully conceived cannot be the victim of a crime because the child has
not been "harmed" by being conceived. Any lingering intuitions that might
lead us to reject liberalism because of our concern for the "wrong" done to
the child can be assuaged by the liberal's permission for a civil action on behalf of the child. The hypothetical case might run like this. A woman knows
she carries a serious genetic defect which creates, say, a 1 in 64 chance that
her child will be born terribly deformed and greatly retarded. She pays Dr.
Sparks for sterilization. He accepts the fee but merely feigns the operation, in
order to maximize his profits. The child is born in the worst possible condition. There is a crime against the mother but, according to Feinberg, not
against the child. (The child has at most a civil action.) Assume the doctor
was paid $N for the operation and the child's civil damages are measured only by its medical expenses, which are $M. If M is greater than N times 64, the
doctor won't fake the operation, whether there is a civil action or not. If
there is a civil action, obviously his profits are not maximized because he
loses more than he can expect to make. If a tort action is not allowed, the
child's insurer, if it knows everything, will maximize its profits by paying the

7. Or, of course, patent infringements, breaches of express trust, racketeer-influenced corrupt organizational activity, or what not.
8. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
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doctor something less than $M not to fake the operation. On the other hand,
if $M is less than $N times 64, the doctor will always maximize his profits and
feign the operation, again whether he is civilly liable or not. So the rule of
civil law has no effect on what happens where there are perfect knowledge
and no transaction costs.
There are many practical objections to this example. The civil action might
include a punitive damage element. The perfect foreknowledge it assumes
will never obtain. The doctor's license will be revoked. He may even be
stoned to death by legal moralists. As a practical matter, he would not engage
in the transaction because it is a crime against the mother. But the abstract
point remains. Rules of tort liability themselves will not make the doctor suffer or change his ways. Those results follow only because the legal rules alter
the context of knowledge and transaction costs or because the doctor's conduct is made a crime. In fact, one particularly effective way to alter the transaction costs would be to invoke the institutions of the criminal law to subsidize the litigation and investigation of the case against the doctor, but that
economist's point is not mine. 9 My point is that the doctor should suffer and
change his ways, whether M is greater than 64N or not, whether transaction
costs are negligible or not. Only the criminal sanction assures that in theory,
and a theory that does not allow that assurance is incomplete.
Perhaps the reason this work fails to convince is that the limits of the
criminal law, unlike its contents, are not really an issue for moral philosophy.
The author devotes chapter 5 to what he calls "mediating maxims," that is,
to "guides to the application of a liberty-limiting principle in practical contexts." But as George Fletcher observed in 1978, "Criminal law is a species of
political and moral philosophy."' 0 The interpretation of these "practical
contexts" must in itself involve a substantial inquiry into the nature of state
power and, as I have already suggested, some conception of what is distinctive about the criminal law. To allow political philosophy to play only a
mediating role in defining the limits of the criminal law risks a serious failure.
That failure is the blurring of what is philosophically just with what happens
to be familiar belief in our particular version of a liberal society. This risk is
great when the word "legitimacy" is given a central role to play, as Feinberg
gives it.
Legitimacy has an everyday meaning of authorized by the boss, real rather
than fake, with the approval of the owner of the credit card, and so on. In
this usage, it refers to a basic question of fact-what did he say, what animal
last wore this pelt, is your name Charles F. Frost? But legitimacy is also a
political word, as in the legitimacy of primogeniture or of the government of
Poland or of judicial activism. This political usage is never simply a question
of fact: it is an appeal to some abstract theory of justice, the state, or the like.

9. It i Judge Posner's. See Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193

(1985).
10. G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law xix (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) (emphasis added).
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At one point, Feinberg talks of "criminal statutes that are legitimized by
valid moral principles" (at 6). This kind of legitimacy entails a political
philosophy powerful enough to explain the authority of the community over
the individual and the individual's duty of obedience. Without some philosophical position on these issues, it is too easy to take them for granted by
assuming the correctness of political institutions which are merely familiar.
And the way to hide this jumping to conclusions is to use the word legitimacy
at the same time at two different levels. Thus, Feinberg goes on to say that
"The idea of legitimacy is not an invention of arcane philosophy. It is part of
the conceptual equipment of every man and woman 'on the street"' (at 6). If
the street in question is governed and educated by the precepts of American
constitutional democracy, then the case for the legitimacy of, say, the right
of privacy, will be as intuitive, as inevitable, as the belief that a Big Mac is
suitable nourishment for an adult. But this case will not be the same for the
man who rides the Clapham omnibus with Baron Bramwell as it is for the
man who rides the I.R.T. with Bernhard Goetz.

